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Why Is There Universal Macro-Behavior? 
Renormalization Group Explanation As Non-causal Explanation 
 
Alexander Reutlinger1 
 
Abstract. Renormalization group (RG) methods are an established strategy to explain how 
it is possible that microscopically different systems exhibit virtually the same macro 
behavior when undergoing phase-transitions. I argue – in agreement with Robert Batterman 
– that RG explanations are non-causal explanations. However, Batterman misidentifies the 
reason why RG explanations are non-causal: it is not the case that an explanation is non-
causal if it ignores causal details. I propose an alternative argument, according to which RG 
explanations are non-causal explanations because their explanatory power is due to the 
application mathematical operations, which do not serve the purpose of representing causal 
relations. 
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1. Introduction  
It is a puzzling and highly non-trivial fact that the macro-behavior of systems with many 
micro components is largely independent of the micro-behavior in the sense that the macro-
behavior is universal. Macro-behavior is universal if the same macro-behavior can be 
realized by microscopically different systems. Universality is a technical term used in the 
physics literature – the more familiar philosophical term for the phenomenon is, at least for 
the purpose of this discussion, multiple realizability. One prominent example in the recent 
literature consists in microscopically different physical systems (such as various liquids, 
gases, magnets) that display the same macro-behavior when undergoing phase-transitions 
(Batterman 2000, 2002). Scientists and philosophers alike believe that the universality of 
macro-behavior cries out for an explanation: how can we explain the remarkable fact that 
there is universal macro-behavior? Robert Batterman (2000, 11) provides a recent and 
influential attempt to answer this question. Batterman motivates and illustrates the question 
by referring to Jerry Fodor’s catchy way of articulating the request for an explanation:  
  
Damn near everything we know about the world suggests that unimaginably 
complicated to-ings and fro-ings of bits and pieces at the extreme micro-level 
manage somehow to converge on stable macro-level properties. […] [T]he 
‘somehow’, really is entirely mysterious […] why there should be (how there 
could be) macro level regularities at all in a world where, by common consent, 
macro level stabilities have to supervene on a buzzing, blooming confusion of 
micro level interactions. (Fodor 1997, 161) 
 
Fodor demands an explanation for how it is possible that universal (or multiply realized) 
macro-regularities obtain given the “confusion of micro level interactions”.  
Batterman addresses Fodor’s challenge by appealing to a method that physicists use 
in order to explain universality. Batterman’s paradigm example of such a method is the 
Renormalization Group (henceforth, RG) method that enables us to explain why it is the 
case that microscopically different systems display the same macro-behavior when 
undergoing phase-transitions (for instance, gases, fluids and magnets). The guiding idea of 
RG is to ignore various microscopic details and interactions that are irrelevant for the 
macro-behavior in question. RG is a general explanatory strategy to distinguish relevant 
and irrelevant micro-details. In short, Batterman’s response to Fodor’s challenge is that 
microscopically diverse materials can realize the same macro-behavior, because many 
differences in the micro-details simply do not matter for the macro-behavior (Morrison 
2012). 
The primary focus of this paper is to inquire what kind of an explanation the RG-
based explanation of universal macro-behavior is and, in particular, whether such an 
explanation is a causal explanation. The goal of this paper is to defend a non-causal 
interpretation of RG explanations by arguing that RG explanation is a specific kind of 
mathematical explanation. The rough idea of a mathematical explanation is that the 
explanation works in virtue of mathematical facts and mathematical operations, which do 
not represent causal relations in the world. Which relations are counted as causal is judged 
by using the so-called ‘folk notion’ and the associated ‘folk features’ of causation (such as 
being asymmetric and time-asymmetric relations, being relations holding between tokens or 
types of events).2   
More precisely, I proceed as follows: In section 2, I outline three essential elements 
of an RG explanation. I agree with Batterman that the RG method does not provide a causal 
explanation. However, I argue that his argument for this claim is ill-founded (section 3). 
The goal of the paper is to explore whether there is an alternative argument to support a 
non-causal interpretation of RG explanations. I propose an alternative argument for the 
claim that the RG explanation is non-causal (section 4). The alternative argument builds on 
and significantly extends Marc Lange’s (2012) concept of a mathematical explanation in 
order to argue that RG explanations are non-causal in virtue of being mathematical 
explanations.    
 
2. RG Explanations of Universality  
In this section, I outline how an RG explanation works. The discussion here will be largely 
non-technical as the paper is concerned with a non-technical question (I mostly follow the 
exposition in Batterman 2000). Batterman’s prime examples of universal behavior are 
phase-transitions in fluids, gases, and magnets (prominently discussed in Batterman 2000, 
2002, 2010). His main focus is on explaining the surprising fact that materially different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See Norton (2007, 36-38) and Ladyman and Ross (2007, 268). As these philosophers 
point out, causation is often characterised by these features not only in ordinary discourse 
but also in special science discourse. 
systems (various gases, fluids, magnets) display the same macro-behavior when undergoing 
phase transitions (for instance, transitions from a liquid to a vaporous phase, or transitions 
from a ferromagnetic to a paramagnetic phase near the critical temperature). If 
microscopically different systems (for instance, fluids and magnets) display the same 
macro-behavior when undergoing phase transitions, then “sameness” is characterized by 
the same critical exponent (a dimensionless number, cf. Batterman 2000, 125-126). The 
explanandum of interest is this sameness in character of macro-behavior.3  
It is useful to understand the workings of RG explanations of universality in terms 
of three explanatory steps: firstly, system-specific laws governing the interactions among 
the micro-components of a physical system (Hamiltonians); secondly, renormalization 
group transformations; and, thirdly, the flow of Hamiltonians. Let me briefly present these 
steps in slightly more detail (as indicated above, I am not able to do justice to the elegant 
technical details of RG in this short paper; see Batterman 2000, 137-144 and Fisher 1982, 
chapter 5 for a detailed survey.)  
First Step: Hamiltonians  
RG explains the universal macro-behavior of gases and fluids by representing the physical 
system in question using a Hamiltonian – a function characterizing, among other things, the 
interactions between the components (or degrees of freedom4) of the system. One specific 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Due to space constraints, I do not discuss whether there is a general model of explanation 
unifying causal and non-causal explanation. See Woodward (2003, 220-221) and Strevens 
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counterfactual dependence and difference-making.     
4 Wilson (2010) provides a detailed discussion of the concept of degrees of freedom. 
epistemic problem with the Hamiltonian of a ‘real’ physical system undergoing phase 
transition (say, a heating pot of water) is that each component of such a system does not 
merely interact with its nearby neighbors but also with distant components. Hence, keeping 
track of the interaction between all the components of, say, a liquid undergoing phase 
transitions is – given the large number of components – epistemically intractable.   
  
Second Step: Transformations  
The second element of the RG explanation deals with this epistemic intractability: a 
particular transformation on the Hamiltonian (the “renormalization group transformation”; 
henceforth, RG transformation). Batterman describes the purpose of this kind of 
transformation as   
 
[…] chang[ing] an initial physical Hamiltonian describing a real system into 
another Hamiltonian in the space [of possible Hamiltonians]. The 
transformation preserves, to certain extent, the form of the original 
Hamiltonian so that when the thermodynamic parameters are properly 
adjusted (renormalized) the new renormalized Hamiltonian describes a system 
exhibiting similar behavior. (Batterman 2000, 126-127)  
 
Operations such as spatial contraction and the renormalization of parameters that are 
involved in RG transformations allow to represent one and the same fluid F in a different 
way: the number of interacting components of F (or degrees of freedom) is effectively 
reduced. That is, the transformed Hamiltonian of F describes the interaction of fewer 
components (or fewer degrees of freedom). Repeatedly applying RG transformations 
amounts to a description of the system, say fluid F, on larger and larger length scales; the 
RG transformation is a coarse-graining procedure. 5  Carrying out the transformation 
repeatedly comes with an epistemic benefit: 
 
[…] the transformation effects a reduction in the number of coupled 
components or degrees of freedom within the correlation length. Thus, the 
new renormalized Hamiltonian describes a system that presents a more 
tractable problem and is easier to deal with. By repeated application of this 
renormalization group transformation the problem becomes more and more 
tractable […]. (Batterman 2000, 126f) 
 
In other words, the RG transformation solves the epistemic problem of intractability (see 
above). Essentially, RG-transformations eliminate micro-details irrelevant for the 
explanation of phase-transitions.  
 
Third Step: Flow of Hamiltonians  
Using Batterman’s terminology, suppose we start with the “initial physical manifold” or, 
equivalently, the “real physical” Hamiltonian H of a fluid F (undergoing a phase transition 
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near the critical temperature). Then one repeatedly applies the RG transformation and 
obtains other Hamiltonians describing the same system F with fewer component 
interactions than H. Interestingly, these different Hamiltonians “flow” into the same fixed 
point (in the space of possible Hamiltonians), which describes a specific behavior 
characterized by a critical exponent (Batterman 2000, 143). Now suppose there is another 
fluid F* and its behavior (during phase transition) is described by the initial Hamiltonian 
H*. Repeatedly applying the RG transformation to H* generates other, equivalent 
Hamiltonians (with fewer component interactions than H*). If the Hamiltonians 
representing fluid F* and fluid F turn out to “flow” to the same fixed point, then their 
behavior, when undergoing phase transition, is characterized by the same critical exponent 
(Fisher 1982, 85; Batterman 2000, 143).  
Hence, we have arrived at the explanandum of an RG explanation: the three 
elements of an RG explanation provide a method to determine under which conditions two 
microscopically different systems (that is, systems with different initial “real physical” 
Hamiltonians) belong to the same “universality class”, i.e. are characterized by the same 
critical exponent (Fisher 1982, 87). Two systems belong to the same universality class, if 
reiterating RG transformations reveals that both systems “flow” to the same fixed point.  
Batterman certainly has a point when he claims the RG method explains by showing 
how various details about component interactions are irrelevant for the macro-behavior of 
systems (Batterman 2000, 127). RG explanations do not merely reveal what is irrelevant 
but also provide information about what is relevant for a specific macro-behavior. 
Batterman verbatim: 
 For instance it turns out that that the critical exponent can be shown to depend on 
the spatial dimension of the system and on the symmetry properties of the order 
parameter. So, for example, systems with one spatial dimension or quasi-one 
dimensional systems such as polymers, exhibit different exponents that (quasi-) two 
dimensional systems like films. (Batterman 2000, 127)  
 
This is, roughly, how Batterman thinks that RG explanations of universal behavior work. I 
have no ambition to challenge his exposition. The main question of this paper is whether 
any of the three elements of an RG explanation warrants a non-causal interpretation of such 
an explanation.6 
 
3. Against Batterman’s Anti-causal Argument  
Batterman presents a principled objection – his anti-causal argument – to subsuming RG 
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6 I will not address two separable issues regarding RG explanations: (1) whether RG 
explanations are reductive explanations and (2) which role limit theorems play in RG 
explanations. Some philosophers have recently argued – contra Batterman (2002) and 
Morrison (2012) – that RG explanations are Nagelian reductions (Butterfield 2011, Norton 
2012) and reductive micro-explanations (Hüttemann et al. forthcoming). Even if these 
views are correct, it is possible to distinguish causal elements (Hamiltonians) and 
potentially non-causal elements (RG transformations and the flow of Hamiltonians) of an 
RG explanation. Moreover, Norton (2012) holds that (a) limit theorems involves strong 
idealizations and require careful interpretation, and that (b) the idealizations in question are, 
ultimately and contrary to Batterman and Morrison, dispensable for RG explanations of 
universality. All I wish stress is that the issue of whether RG explanations involve 
idealizations is also independent of the matter whether RG explanations are causal or not.     
runs as follows: according to the causal model, explanations do not and cannot ignore 
causal “micro details” because an explanation provides “detailed causal-mechanical 
accounts of the workings of the mechanisms leading to the occurrence of the explanandum 
phenomenon” (Batterman 2000, 28). A causal explanation “tells us all of the gory details” 
(ibid.) about why a particular effect occurs (Batterman 2010, 2 and 21). However, ignoring 
certain details about the interactions of components of a physical system seems to be 
essential for the second step of the RG explanation (that is, the RG transformations). 
Batterman concludes that the causal model of scientific explanation cannot accommodate 
RG explanations.  
To be fair, suppose that causal relations are characterized by the so-called ‘folk role’ 
(Norton 2007; Price and Corry 2007). The folk role characterizes causal relations as 
holding between tokens of events (in the case of actual causation) or between types of 
events (in the case of type-level causation). Moreover, the folk notion assigns specific 
features to causal relations: relations of this kind are, among other things, asymmetric and 
time-asymmetric (dependence) relations. Batterman seems to be right that if explanation 
just is providing information about causes and if causation is a (counterfactual, 
probabilistic, nomic etc.) dependence relation between (tokens or types of) events, then RG 
explanations do not easily fit into a causal model of scientific explanation. However, there 
are at least two objections to Batterman’s anti-causal argument that the causal model does 
not fit RG explanations because the former cannot account for abstracting away from 
details. 
First, as many philosophers working on causation in the special sciences have 
pointed out, many perfectly legitimate causal explanations in these sciences do in fact 
frequently ignore lower-level details (Cartwright 1989; Woodward 2003; Strevens 2008). 
For instance, a micro-economic explanation of an increase of the price of a commodity 
cites causes but ignores many psychological, biological and physical details about the 
agents that interact on a market. Similarly, even a neuro-scientific micro-mechanistic 
explanation of long term potentiation refers to the activities of neurons but abstracts from 
various physical details without losing the causal character of the explanation (Craver 2007, 
65-72). These examples support the claim that it is compatible to explain by citing causes 
and mechanisms and, at the same time, to ignore details. Therefore, these examples 
undermine Batterman’s anti-causal argument. 
Second, Batterman’s characterization of the causal model of scientific explanation – 
that is, not being able to ignore details – is inaccurate as a general characterization. This 
characterization applies only to a specific version of the causal account (such a Railton’s 
account, to which Batterman alludes; Batterman 2002, 28). In contrast to Batterman’s view, 
a number of recent influential causal models of explanation are explicitly designed to 
account for the fact that many excellent scientific explanations “ignore details”. For 
instance, Strevens (2008) and Franklin-Hall (manuscript) explicitly deny that explanation 
merely consists in citing causes; they add an “optimizing procedure” (Strevens) and a 
“biggest bang-for-your-buck” principle (Franklin-Hall), which are procedures to omit 
irrelevant causal information. Woodward’s (2010) notion of causal specificity plays a 
similar role in his theory of causal explanation; it determines the accurate explanatory level 
of abstraction from (causal) details. Hence, Batterman’s key claim that the causal model of 
explanation cannot account for explanations that involve abstractions from details is either 
controversial (to say the least), or Batterman’s anti-causal argument induces a merely 
verbal dispute regarding whether the cases – which Strevens, Franklin-Hall and Woodward 
discuss – deserve to be called causal explanations.   
If these objections are striking and Batterman’s anti-causal argument fails, where 
does this leave us? At least two reactions are possible. One reaction might be to defend the 
view that one of the above-mentioned causal models of explanation applies, contra 
Batterman, to RG explanations. I will not pursue this strategy. My main reason not to 
pursue this strategy is that causal explanation can, at best, explain why a particular behavior 
of a system, say a fluid F, occurs by citing a cause or an underlying causal micro-
mechanism. This seems to hold independently of whether a causal explanation abstracts 
from details or not. As a matter of fact, Strevens, Franklin-Hall and Woodward are 
primarily and explicitly concerned with the question how one can simplify a system-
specific causal model, why the behavior of one kind of a system depends on few macro-
variables, and exactly how one can reasonably abstract from the micro details of one kind 
of system. For instance, Strevens (2003, 2008) cares about methodological principles 
enabling ecologists to ignore certain causal micro-details of the interactions between a 
specific population of foxes and a specific population of rabbits and to, ultimately, 
determine a small number of macro-variables, which can be used to explain and predict the 
growth of these specific populations of foxes and rabbits. Call questions of this kind 
‘system-specific question’. Let us grant that these philosophers provide satisfactory 
answers to these system-specific questions. However, it is at least not obvious that causal 
models of explanation are also suited to successfully address the question why two different 
systems with different underlying causal mechanisms, say two fluids F and F*, display the 
same macro-behavior (similarly, Batterman 2002, 23-24). The point I wish to stress is that 
it is, at least, a challenge even for those causal models of explanation with an in-built 
abstraction principle to accommodate RG explanations, because the latter address the 
question why micro-causally different systems behave similarly on the macro-level. Call 
this challenge the ‘inter-systems challenge’. I take this challenge to be good enough to 
motivate a different reaction to the failure of Batterman’s anti-causal argument.      
I explore a second strategy, according to which the conclusion of Batterman’s anti-
causal argument is true (that is, RG explanations are non-causal explanations) and this 
conclusion is supported by an alternative argument. The next section elaborates the 
alternative argument for the claim that RG explanation is not causal (in addition to the 
inter-systems objection presented in the previous paragraph) and provides a positive 
characterization of non-causal explanations.    
 
4. RG Explanation as Mathematical Explanation  
In order to decide whether RG explanations are non-causal one needs a criterion to 
distinguish causal and (at least some sorts of) non-causal explanations. Marc Lange (2012) 
provides a useful candidate for such a criterion. Lange argues that one ought to distinguish 
(a) explanations that explain in virtue of describing cause-effect relations in the world and 
(b) explanations whose explanatory powers stems from “distinctively mathematical” facts. 
In order to avoid misunderstandings, let me clarify that I will not adopt Lange’s approach 
straightforwardly. Instead I propose an amended and enriched account of mathematical 
explanation, which preserves only some of Lange’s core ideas and includes one of 
Batterman’s (2010) core insights regarding mathematical explanations. It is argued that this 
account of mathematical explanation provides good reasons to believe that RG explanations 
are non-causal explanations because of being mathematical explanations.     
Lange illustrates how a mathematical explanation works by using the following toy7 
example: the empirical fact that Marc has three children and twenty-three strawberries, and 
the distinctively mathematical fact that twenty-three cannot be divided evenly by three, 
explains why Marc failed when he tried a moment ago to distribute his strawberries evenly 
among his children without cutting any. Lange points out that a distinctively mathematical 
explanation may include some causal information. For instance, the explanation may 
include information about which beliefs and desires regarding his three children caused 
Marc to distribute the strawberries, information about the proper functioning of 
physiological mechanism of his body and the bodies of his children during the time that the 
distribution of strawberries takes etc. For the purposes of this paper, it is instructive that 
Lange thinks of causal information – in the context of mathematical explanations – as a 
presupposition of the explanation-seeking why-question (Lange 2012, 13). For instance, in 
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configurations.  
the case of the strawberry example the why question is: presupposing that Marc’s beliefs 
and desires caused him to distribute the strawberries and presupposing the proper 
functioning of physiological mechanism of his body and the bodies of his children during 
the time of the distribution etc., why did Marc fail to distribute the strawberries evenly? The 
explanation of why he failed to distribute the strawberries evenly among his three children 
is, however, non-causal, as the explanatory force is exclusively derived from a distinctively 
mathematical fact (that is, the fact that twenty-three cannot be divided evenly by three). In 
other words, if an explanation derives its explanatory power from distinctively 
mathematical facts (and not from a description of causes of the explanandum), then the 
explanation is non-causal.  
I anticipate a worry at this point. One might be concerned that ‘appealing to 
mathematics’ is not sufficient for rendering an explanation non-causal. This would be a 
devastating result for an account of mathematical explanation. However, it is, of course, not 
the case – and Lange explicit repeatedly stresses this point – that if an explanation is 
formulated in terms of mathematics, then it is non-causal. One can appeal to the folk 
features of causation in order to argue that some explanatory mathematical statements are 
correctly interpreted as causal statements. For instance, in the recent causal modeling 
literature, causal explanations refer to causal generalizations or so-called structural 
equations (Woodward 2003). These generalizations are mathematical statements about 
functional dependencies between variables. Explanations that refer to these functional 
dependencies are causal explanations, because these dependencies hold between types of 
events (expressed as the values of random variables) and the dependencies are typically 
taken to have the features associated with the folk notion of causation (such as being 
asymmetric and time-asymmetric dependence relations). Hence, explanations can perfectly 
well refer to causal generalizations, which are couched in mathematical language, without 
losing their causal character. Similarly, the fact that billiard ball A has a certain velocity 
might be causally explained by A’s collision with another billiard ball B. Assume that the 
behavior of these billiard balls is governed by Newtonian laws of motion. If it is the case 
that the nomic relations in this scenario hold between the types or tokens of events, and if 
the nomic relations instantiate sufficiently many other folk features of causation, then these 
mathematically formulated laws causally explain why the billiard ball A has a particular 
velocity. 
Taking this worry into account, I adopt the following preliminary definition of a 
non-causal explanation that will be refined later on: an explanation is non-causal iff the 
explanans contains at least one non-causal element e, and e ensures the success of the 
explanation. In the case of a mathematical explanation, the non-causal component e is a 
claim stating a mathematical fact (e.g. that twenty-three cannot be divided by three). As I 
discuss in more detail below, my disagreement with Lange concerns the question whether 
Lange’s ‘distinctively’ mathematical facts exhaust the class of explanatory non-causal 
mathematical facts. Following Batterman (2010), I argue that the class of explanatory facts 
also includes (contingent) facts about the applicability of mathematical operations.  
Let us see if this criterion helps to decide whether RG explanations are non-causal 
in virtue of being distinctively mathematical. I will go through the three steps of an RG 
explanation. The first element of an RG explanation is the Hamiltonian of a system. Since 
the Hamiltonian describes the interaction between the components of a system (a gas, a 
fluid, a magnet) this component contains causal information.8 Hence, this step of an RG 
explanation is at least unlikely to warrant a non-causal interpretation of RG explanations.  
Do the remaining two steps of an RG explanation warrant a non-causal qua 
mathematical interpretation? Recall that the fact to be explains is why it is the case that two 
systems S and S* – which are microscopically different and, therefore, characterized by 
different Hamiltonians H and H* – exhibit the same macro behavior when undergoing 
phase transitions. To see that the demand for an explanation is to an extent independent of 
the Hamiltonians, one is able to phrase the explanation-seeking why-question in the 
following way: the Hamiltonians H and H* play the role of, to adopt Lange’s terminology, 
presuppositions of the explanation-seeking why-question. That is, presupposing that S has 
the initial Hamiltonian H and S* has the initial Hamiltonian H*, why is it the case that S 
and S* display universal macro-behavior (characterized by the same critical exponent)? As 
in the strawberry case, the explanation-seeking why-question presupposes that a particular 
causal structure is in place. In the strawberry case, the presupposition concerns beliefs and 
desires that are effective, the working of physiological mechanisms etc.; in the RG case, it 
is presupposed that Hamiltonians describe the causal interactions among the components of 
a system. I argue that the RG-answer to this why-question is mathematical. The 
mathematical explanatory power is derived from the remaining two elements of an RG 
explanation: the transformations and flow of Hamiltonians. If this is correct, then RG 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For brevity’s sake and for the sake of the argument, I ignore Russellian arguments here, 
according to which fundamental physical laws are not causal laws (Price and Corry 2007).    
explanations are non-causal explanations.  
Which facts count as mathematical facts? Applying Lange’s concept of a 
distinctively mathematical explanation to RG explanations reveals a disanalogy between 
the strawberry scenario and the RG explanation. Lange appeals to mathematical facts in a 
strict or “distinctive” sense: for instance, a number (such as twenty-three) and its features 
(such as not being evenly divisible by three). However, the mathematical elements figuring 
in RG explanations are unlike mathematical facts in the strict sense: the former are 
mathematical operations rather than mathematical facts. I take this as a forceful suggestion 
to extend Lange’s original account by enriching the class of mathematically explanatory 
facts. Here I follow Batterman (2010, 7-8) who introduces a helpful distinction of kinds of 
explanatory mathematical facts: (metaphysically necessary) facts about (abstract) 
mathematical entities such as numbers, sets, graphs (and their properties), and facts about 
mathematical operations (taking the thermodynamic limit is his primary example of a 
mathematical operation with explanatory import).9 Batterman (2010) does not exploit this 
distinction in order to strengthen his claim that RG explanations are non-causal; his goal is 
to undermine the indispensability argument for platonism and the “mapping account” of 
explanatory mathematical models.  I will use Batterman’s distinction between entities and 
operations for deciding whether RG explanations are mathematical in character and, hence, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Following Bueno and French’s (2011) criticism, I do not agree with Batterman’s claim 
that there is a sharp distinction between facts and operations. However, I find it useful to 
draw attention to (1) a kind of explanatory mathematics (such as in steps two and three of 
RG explanations) that is often ignored, and to (2) different modal strengths of “distinctively 
mathematical” facts and facts about applying operations.   
non-causal.  
I anticipate another worry at this point. One might object that extending Lange’s 
account by allowing mathematical facts and operations to be explanatory misses a crucial 
feature of Lange’s notion of distinctively mathematical explanations. Namely, it leaves out 
the feature that distinctively mathematical facts possess a kind of modality that is stronger 
than physical modality. For example, Lange appeals to an explanatory mathematical fact, 
according to which it is metaphysically necessary (and not merely physically necessary) 
that twenty-three cannot be evenly divided by three. 10  By contrast, a mathematical 
operation (such as an RG transformation) does not apply to a physical system with 
metaphysical necessity; such an operation applies given physically contingent conditions 
(Shimony 1993, 208). In response, I do not deny that – given the strawberry case and the 
RG case – there is such a difference in the modal character of the explanatory facts, but I do 
not follow Lange in taking metaphysical necessity as the distinctive feature of (non-causal) 
explanatory mathematics. Instead it is my claim, for which I will argue in the remainder of 
this section, that one need not appeal to metaphysical necessity in order to claim that 
mathematical facts explain in a non-causal way. All one needs to establish is that the 
mathematics does not explain by referring to causal facts (that is, facts about relations that 
count as causal in the light of the folk notion of causation). Philosophers who are skeptical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 However, when discussing the distinctively mathematical explanation of the behavior of 
a simple double pendulum, Lange weakens this condition and acknowledges instances of 
distinctively mathematical explanations, according to which the relevant explanatory 
mathematics is “not a mathematical, conceptual, metaphysical, or logical truth” (Lange 
2012, 20). 
of metaphysical necessity (and other kinds of necessity that are stronger than physical 
necessity) might even regard this strategy as having an advantage over Lange’s approach.     
 Which steps render the RG explanation a mathematical explanation? As presented 
in section 2, the RG method explains the universality of critical behavior by invoking two 
elements besides the Hamiltonian of a physical system: (a) RG transformations on the 
Hamiltonians in question that enable physicists to ignore aspects of the interactions 
between micro components of, say, a fluid, and (b) a “flow” or mapping of transformed 
Hamiltonians (of fluids F and F*) to the same fixed point that allows to calculate the 
critical exponent. Operations such as spatial contraction and the renormalization of 
parameters, of which the RG transformation consists, reduce the number of interacting 
components (or degrees of freedom). This coarse-graining procedure helps to solve the 
problem of epistemic intractability (see section 2). The “flow” or mapping of the 
Hamiltonians, which are generated by iterated RG transformations, is an operation that 
ultimately determines the critical exponents of microscopically different systems and, based 
on the sameness of critical exponents, groups physical systems into universality classes. 
Both the transformations and the ‘flow’ are mathematical operations, which, ultimately, 
serve the purpose to reveal something that two fluids have in common despite the fact that 
their “real physical” Hamiltonians (or “initial physical manifolds”) are strikingly different. 
Recall that I use the folk notion of causation in order to decide whether an explanatory fact 
is causal or not. Let us apply this test to the case at hand. Neither the RG transformations 
nor the flow of Hamiltonians relate tokens or types of events. Rather both operations relate 
entire Hamiltonians in the space of possible Hamiltonians. Hence, both operations relate the 
wrong kinds of entities for being causal relations. Moreover, neither RG transformations 
nor the flow of Hamiltonians relate entities in the way required for causal relations: both 
operations obviously fail to relate entities in a time-asymmetric and asymmetric way. To 
see why, suppose once more that the Hamiltonians H and H* represent the interactions of 
the micro-components of some fluid F, and H* is the product of an RG transformation on 
the “real physical” H. If this is the situation, then it is not the case that Hamiltonian H 
occurs before (or after) Hamiltonian H*, because Hamiltonians simply do not stand in 
temporal relations. It also seems to be inaccurate to say that H and H* stand in any 
significantly asymmetric dependence relation because H and H* are equivalent 
representations of the same fluid F (when undergoing phase transition). Therefore, neither 
of the two mathematical operations involved in RG explanations is best understood as 
directly revealing information about cause-effect relations. If this observation is correct 
then, according to RG, the key to understanding why two microscopically different fluids 
display the same macro-behavior consists in the application of two non-causal 
mathematical operations. Hence, RG explanations are non-causal explanations in virtue of 
being mathematical explanations. 
 
5. Conclusion  
I started out with the demand for an explanation of how it is possible that microscopically 
different systems exhibit virtually the same macro-behavior when undergoing phase-
transitions. A well-established explanation of this phenomenon in physics are RG methods. 
The main goal of this paper was to argue – in agreement with Batterman – that RG 
explanations are non-causal explanations. It was argued that Batterman misidentifies the 
reason why RG explanations are non-causal: he is wrong to claim that if an explanation 
ignores causal (micro) details, then it is not a causal explanation. I proposed an alternative 
argument for the claim that RG explanations are non-causal explanations. RG explanations 
are non-causal explanations because their explanatory power is due to the application of 
mathematical operations, which do not serve the purpose of representing causal relations.  
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